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“Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes 
should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.” 
         -- NCAA Bylaws, Article 12 
 
As the financial stakes in intercollegiate sports continue to rise, the issue of the 
NCAA’s efforts to restrain the compensation of college athletes – particularly those in 
football and men’s basketball – grows increasingly important.  The NCAA has long 
maintained that amateurism is an essential component of the product it sells and that its 
rules regulating the compensation of athletes are procompetitive because they preserve 
amateurism and thereby maintain competitive balance.  Yet, if amateurism is what 
consumers of college sports demand, there ought to be no need to collude to preserve it.  
If fans prefer high-quality university affiliated sports, amateurism is neither a reasonable 
nor necessary restraint to creating a product, and concerted action to preserve amateurism 
is mere wage fixing.   
In 1992, Arthur Fleisher, Brian Goff, and Robert Tollison published a book 
examining the NCAA through the lens of cartel economics.1  They concluded that the 
NCAA was indeed a cartel with monopsony power in the labor market for athletes.  
Revenues have doubled since the time they drew their conclusions.  Not only does the 
  
NCAA have monopsony power over athletes, but athletes’ forgone rents2 are huge and 
increasing rapidly.3 
The NCAA and its member schools generate very large revenues, even by 
professional sports leagues standards. NCAA accounting takes great pains to mask profit 
as expenses (by allowing schools to charge their athletic programs high prices for self-
supplied services, by funneling surpluses into premium facilities, which are charged 
against the athletic program, but which benefit the campus as a whole, and other ruses).  
Yet even by their own creative standards, NCAA data shows that revenues, which stood 
far above expenses in 1989, have outstripped costs over the last decade, and promise to 
grow even faster with the NCAA’s new basketball contract for 2002 – 2013.4 
Despite the profitability of the NCAA, the term “cartel” may not perfectly 
describe the NCAA and its member institutions, primarily because an individual athletic 
team cannot produce an athletic event by itself.  The NCAA is more appropriately 
described as a joint venture that has, like other joint ventures, certain aspects that must be 
agreed upon. 
While it is necessary for the NCAA to set rules regarding scheduling and safety 
and the like, an agreement among all of its members not to compete for its most 
important resource, the athletes, is unnecessary and unreasonable.  It lowers the quality of 
the game and exploits the athletes.  This unjustified activity should not be legalized 
simply by defining it as an essential component of the product being offered, especially 
without that claim being rigorously scrutinized by the courts.   From the point of view of 
antitrust economics, the NCAA’s claims ultimately rest on an unproven assumption: fans 
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preference for amateurism is a sin qua non of college sports.  If this is not true, the 
NCAA has no reasonable defense for its otherwise collusive wage fixing. 
The NCAA and Cartel-like Actions 
Per se or Rule of Reason Analysis.  In most industries, the courts would normally view a 
joint venture of almost all major suppliers or purchasers in the market as an illegal cartel.  
An agreement to set the wages of an entire class of employees would be ruled per se 
illegal.5  However, in sports, the courts have also ruled that certain types of otherwise per 
se illegal horizontal restraints are necessary to allow the product to exist at all and have 
adjudicated these cases using rule of reason analysis.6   
This special application of rule of reason analysis to sports joint ventures has been 
developed through a substantial body of case law.  These cases generally have held that 
sports leagues are procompetitive joint ventures necessary to create a product, such as 
NFL football, so that some level of what would otherwise be labeled collusion is 
accepted as a procompetitive activity necessary to create the product.7 Consequently, the 
courts have given these procompetitive joint ventures fairly wide latitude in creating what 
are deemed to be reasonable ancillary restrictions to maintain the procompetitive joint 
venture.  Thus, the concerted effort of the NCAA schools to restrict wages would 
certainly be tried under the rule of reason. 
Market Definition Under the Rule of Reason.  In traditional rule of reason analysis, 
determining whether the NCAA has market power and can thus effectively act like a 
cartel first involves defining a relevant geographic and product  market.  Second, an 
examination of whether the NCAA has market power (often measured through market 
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share and concentration) and the impact from any potential entrants is required.  Finally, 
positive and adverse effects are weighed against each other to determine whether the 
conduct is pro- or anticompetitive on the whole. 
Geographic and Product Markets.  The relevant geographic market is generally accepted 
to be the United States, given the general lack of university-based “big-time” sports 
outside the United States, and the primarily national recruiting market for premier college 
athletes. 
Previous cases have determined that the product produced by the NCAA is 
collegiate sports, thus making the NCAA a de facto monopolist/dominant supplier of the 
product. The only other competitor is the National Association of Intercollegiate 
Athletics (NAIA), an association of schools with very small athletic programs that do not 
generate any significant revenues and do not compete for premier college athletes.  The 
NCAA’s market share is most likely in the upper 90 percent range for college athletics.  
As noted by Fleisher et al., “For all practical purposes, the NCAA today directs and 
controls all major revenue-producing collegiate athletic events.”8 
Of course, when it comes to acquiring talent, the likely product market would be 
the market for the playing services of college-age athletes, perhaps more narrowly 
defined to cover the two revenue generating sports, football and men’s basketball.  In this 
market, the NCAA is also a dominant purchaser.  However, a handful of athletes eligible 
for NCAA play elect to forgo one or more years of collegiate eligibility (sometimes all 
four) to play professionally, and in this respect, professional sports leagues do compete 
for talent with the NCAA.9 
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If this sliver of competition were sufficient to discipline the wage regime in the 
NCAA, the NCAA might be able to argue that it is not able to exercise market power, 
despite its dominant market share. If this were true, we would see wage competition on 
the fringes for the very best talent, with schools offering a player like Stephon Marbury 
financial inducements to remain in college rather than turning pro after one year at 
Georgia Tech.  Instead, we see efforts by the NCAA to impede whatever competition 
might be afforded by the professional leagues by such actions as the no-agent rule, 
whereby a player will be banned from the NCAA for life for merely asking an agent to 
determine whether professional leagues potentially compete for his services.10 
The NCAA is also trying to insulate itself from  competition from the NBA by 
non-compete agreements, as in a recent meeting among the NCAA, the NBA, and the 
National Basketball Players Association to discuss methods to prevent underclassmen 
from entering the professional basketball draft.11  In any other setting, an agreement 
among employers not to hire college students who have not attended four years of school 
would certainly be illegal.  The NCAA’s efforts to hoard skilled athletes may show that 
the two leagues do compete on the margin for the very best talent, but it is even stronger 
evidence that the NCAA has actively sought to restrain trade in this market. 
By this reasoning, the small market share exercised by explicitly professional 
leagues does not constrain the NCAA’s ability to translate its 99 percent market share 
into market power.  Whether or not the market is defined to include athletes who enter 
professional sports before they exhaust their college eligibility, the NCAA is a de facto 
monopsonist in the relevant product market for college-age athletes. 
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Potential Entry.  Antitrust authorities also look to the possibility of new entry into a 
market when evaluating market power.  In this market there are at least two leagues in 
the planning stage, and so the market may see future competition. 12  However, even if 
these leagues become viable, the NCAA will almost certainly remain the dominant firm 
in this market.  Therefore, the possibility of new entry into the market is unlikely to 
change the general conclusions that the NCAA is a de facto monopolist in the market for 
collegiate-level athletics and a de facto monopsonist in the market for purchasing talent. 
Liability and the NCAA’s Defenses: Can Agreement on Wages Be Justified? 
To establish liability, it would be necessary to show that the NCAA has the ability and 
incentive to commit anticompetitive acts, and further that the NCAA’s actions have 
caused harm to competition or consumers.  In previous cases alleging cartel behavior, the 
NCAA has relied upon the fact that the courts generally consider the NCAA to be a 
procompetitive joint venture, capable of imposing reasonable and necessary ancillary 
restraints to create a valued product.  In these cases, the NCAA has offered the need to 
preserve amateurism as evidence of the necessity and reasonableness of its rules 
preventing the payment of players.  However, this line of argument has never been 
subject to full rule of reason scrutiny. 
Full Rule of Reason Analysis Needed: Is Amateurism Reasonable and Necessary?  If 
the NCAA’s concerted agreement on athletes’ wages were challenged in court, it is likely 
that the response would be that amateurism is a necessary and reasonable ancillary 
restraint needed to keep the joint venture (and thus the product) alive, both by creating a 
product differentiated from the NFL’s or NBA’s product, and to maintain competitive 
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balance. The argument in favor of amateurism is formidable in part because it is so 
commonly and uncritically accepted. 
Ironically, NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85; 194 S. Ct. 3948 (1986), which 
established that the NCAA, despite generally being a procompetitive joint venture, was 
nevertheless capable of anticompetitive acts, has become the foundation of a body of case 
law insulating the NCAA from antitrust scrutiny with respect to amateurism.  The Court 
found that “the NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football -- college football.  
The identification of this ‘product’ with an academic tradition differentiates college 
football from and makes it more popular than professional sports to which it might 
otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor league baseball.”  The Court 
stated, without analysis, that the fact that “athletes must not be paid” was necessary “to 
preserve the character and quality of the ‘product.’” 
There is a subtlety here that seems to have been missed by later interpreters of 
NCAA v. Board of Regents.  In essence, the NCAA Court said one thing: academic 
affiliation is what differentiates NCAA football from NFL football, and thus creates a 
market – i.e., this differentiation is procompetitive.  The court then went on to assume 
that a particular restraint used to achieve that differentiation – amateurism – is both 
reasonable and necessary.  In NCAA, there was no need to determine if amateurism was 
actually a reasonable and necessary restraint; the Court merely sought to highlight the 
comparative lack of justification for the NCAA’s TV restraints.   
However, in later cases, particularly McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1340-41 (5th Cir. 1988), Gaines v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn.1990), and Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 
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1088-94 (7th Cir. 1992), the courts have used NCAA as a starting point, reading Supreme 
Court dicta as evidence that amateurism itself has passed the reasonableness test, moving 
forward to evaluate specific follow-on rules designed to support amateurism.13  These 
cases analyze whether the NCAA’s rules are reasonable and necessary for preserving 
amateurism, not if amateurism itself is reasonable and necessary.  Since NCAA did not 
perform this formal analysis (because this question did not apply to the matter at hand), it 
remains an open issue for the courts.14 
The necessity for a formal full-scale rule of reason analysis of the reasonableness 
and necessity of amateurism is highlighted in the trial history of United States v. Brown 
University, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).  The district court found that MIT (as the sole non-
settling defendant) had conspired with the eight Ivy League schools to prevent 
competition for talented students through merit scholarships.  According to the district 
court, MIT and the Ivy League “created a horizontal restraint which interfered with the 
natural functioning of the marketplace by eliminating students’ ability to consider price 
differences when choosing a school and by depriving students of the ability to receive 
financial incentives which competition between those schools may have generated.”  It 
was an “inescapable truth” that “by entering into the Ivy Overlap Agreements, the 
member institutions purposefully removed, by agreement, price considerations and price 
competition for an Overlap school education.” 
MIT had countered that this concerted action was necessary to advance the cause 
of affirmative action, by ensuring that merit scholarship competition for the best students 
did not lower the pool of money available to those most deserving of need-based aid. The 
district court rejected these arguments, saying they were insufficient to justify ignoring 
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the basic premise of the Sherman Act, which is that “the unrestrained interaction of 
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources…”  However, 
on appeal, the Third Circuit determined that the court had not properly weighed MIT’s 
procompetitive arguments, and remanded the case for retrial under the full rule of reason 
standard.  The case eventually settled, with MIT retaining the right to compare 
information on students with other schools but agreeing not to collaborate on financial 
aid offers, similar to the settlement reached with the other eight members of the Ivy 
Overlap group. 
The original district court decision in Brown University contains strong parallels 
to the NCAA’s role in the joint determination of maximal remuneration for college 
athletes.  In both cases, the universities point to redeeming social benefits of the system, 
benefits generated, in part, on behalf of those other than those directly affected by the 
restraint in question.  For the same reasons that the circuit court in Brown University 
insisted that these benefits be analyzed fully under the rule of reason, so too should the 
courts analyze the pro- and anticompetitive effects of amateurism before assuming it is 
necessary for the creation of the product.  The final settlement prevented MIT from 
acting in concert on making financial inducements to students to attend MIT.  This is 
very different from the current NCAA practice on financial inducements offered to 
student-athletes. 
If Amateurism Is Necessary, Why Are NCAA Sports So Professional?  In all respects 
save one, major-college sports are not amateur.  The NCAA rules have been considered 
an attempt “to keep university athletics from becoming professionalized to the extent that 
profit making objectives would overshadow educational objectives” and that “the no-
 9
  
draft rule and other like NCAA regulations preserve the bright line of demarcation 
between college and ‘play for pay’ football.”  In fact, they have not kept college sports 
from becoming professional; they have simply prevented players from receiving direct 
cash payments for their efforts. 
On the supply side, the significant fact is that college sports are indistinguishable 
from “professional” sports on a wide variety of measures: stadiums are now covered with 
advertisements; bowl games now have sponsors’ names; players now wear Nike 
“swoosh” insignia on their uniforms; games are rescheduled in order to coincide with 
broadcast and cablecast wishes; and coaches now get paid premiums for signing 
exclusive contracts with shoe manufacturers if their athletes will wear those shoes on the 
court.  The very best athletes now often leave college before their last year of eligibility 
(sometimes even right out of high school) as the only way to cash in on their market 
value with the pros, since they have no cash-paying option at the college level; teams 
choose their schedules to maximize their chances to participate in multi-million dollar 
post-season events; and head coaches now earn up to $2 million per year (Steve Spurrier, 
head football coach at Florida) to coach amateur sports, in largest part based on their 
ability to successfully recruit and sign the best high school talent.  This is rent-seeking 
behavior by those in power.15 
Furthermore, athletes do get “paid,” but in mostly non-monetary equivalents, and 
a relatively small amount compared to their revenue-generating ability.  That payment 
consists of tuition and room and board scholarships.  Now, in keeping with the recently 
increased commercialization of college sports, the competition for talented athletes 
includes such non-price elements as lavish training facilities, enhanced assistant coach 
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instruction, exposure to future employers (professional teams and advertisers in search of 
spokesmen) through television, and heavy marketing and promotion of the individual 
stars.  For example, football colleges now “nominate” their Heisman trophy “candidates” 
at the start of the season, followed by elaborate promotions and nationwide TV exposure.  
All of these are benefits given to players in exchange for their services, but, the bulk of 
the marginal revenue product and all of the cash flow that the athletes generate goes to 
the universities and their non-athlete employees (coaches, administrators, the NCAA, 
etc.), not to the athletes themselves. 
Does the NCAA Really Sell Amateurism?  Is it Necessary?  The NCAA’s claim that 
amateurism is an essential component of its product offering rests on the assumption that 
there is demand for “amateur sports” as opposed to “collegiate sports in general, 
regardless of whether the athletes get paid.”  This is an open question.  Furthermore, the 
college game is no longer broadly perceived to be “amateur.”  Audiences do not view the 
players as “student-athletes,” but rather as athletes who happen to attend class 
(sometimes). Fans accept the commercialization of college sports; the $3.5 billion in 
NCAA revenue attests to that acceptance and cannot reasonably be perceived simply as 
infatuation with amateurism.16 
It is doubtful that colleges will lose a significant portion of their audience or their 
revenue if the athletes were paid.  In fact, the biggest supporters of college sports, the 
booster clubs and alumni at each school, are also the ones who are often caught 
professionalizing the sport by paying their alma mater’s athletes under the table.  Again, 
college sports has had increasing success despite (perhaps because of!) the recent 
commercialization of the product since the NCAA decision in 1986.  Whether a 
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significant block of fans would be turned off if athletes were paid is an essential 
component of a rule of reason antitrust analysis, not simply a fact for the NCAA to assert 
without critical evaluation.17 
There are many examples of amateur sports that have become professional 
without a serious decrease in the popularity of the product. In golf and tennis, the 
traditional majors were once amateur-only events. Rugby Union has recently made the 
transition to professional status. 18  Even the most hallowed amateur endeavor of all, the 
Olympics, has increased its appeal and revenue generation, even though it no longer 
requires that its athletes be amateurs.19 
It would be presumptuous to argue that professionalization directly caused the 
increase in popularity, but it is this same untested logic that the NCAA uses to defend 
amateurism.  Fans may prefer college sports because they are “amateur,” but they may 
prefer them instead because there is a long tradition of interscholastic rivalry.  The two 
concepts can be separated, and to date, the NCAA has not been asked to substantiate its 
claims that it is amateurism rather than school rivalry as just one example, that truly 
differentiates its offering from NFL football or NBA basketball.   
A Reasonable Alternative: Conference-Level Decisions.   A resolution for properly 
solving the problems associated with the NCAA’s cartel power put forth by Gary Becker 
is simply to break the monopsony power of the cartel by enforcing the antitrust laws and 
allow each university to independently decide what it wants to do.20 
What Becker’s solution lacks, though, is a recognition of the necessity of some general 
agreement among sports competitors in order for the product to exist.  Therefore, a more 
 12
  
viable alternative, that recognizes the necessity of coordination among teams to create 
league sports, is to devolve power from the NCAA to the various collegiate conferences.  
Conferences can play the procompetitive joint-venture role accepted by the courts in their 
treatment of sports leagues, creating the necessary competitive framework for the 
existence of the product.  Each conference, then, could choose a common wage regime, 
and within that conference, the necessary balance for the creation of a team sport would 
be maintained, without the need for an overarching super-cartel to control the entire 
market for college-aged athletes.21 Moreover, the NCAA would still have a 
procompetitive role, ensuring that on-field or on-court rules remain standardized, and 
establishing rungs of competition, so that each conference could align itself for on-field 
competition with other similar conferences, avoiding a fragmentation of the sport into too 
many different games.22 
Some conferences might choose to allow their members to pay market rates to 
athletes in order, as procompetitive joint ventures, to attract top-notch talent and yet 
maintain competitive balance among the conference members.  Other conferences might 
seek to create salary minima and maxima, which, in the context of the conference as 
procompetitive joint venture, might survive a similar rule of reason inquiry.  Some 
conferences might choose to remain at the current level of in-kind-only payments, i.e., 
current NCAA-style amateurism, and seek to differentiate themselves in the market, not 
by attracting the top talent, but instead by offering the “real thing” to those fans who truly 
prefer this method of compensation.  Finally, an Ivy League structure, where there are no 
athletic scholarships, might be adopted by some conferences. 
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Fans would be offered a wide variety of college sports options.  The players 
would also be able to choose among programs and compensation schemes.  There would 
be a diversity of offerings in the market, and these offerings could compete, on the 
field/court as before, and off the court in the hearts (and wallets) of the fans.  The NCAA 
might argue that this would be chaos, but this chaos is typically defined in the antitrust 
literature as a competitive marketplace. 
Would Conference Level Restraints Ruin Competitive Balance?  Any analysis of the 
impact of a change in the NCAA’s rules on amateurism must recognize that the current 
NCAA structure allows for significantly unbalanced matches.  When Georgetown 
University plays Bethune-Cookman in basketball, two widely imbalanced programs 
operating under very different financial conditions square off. If compensation systems 
were to vary by conference, the Georgetown players would still win easily but now 
would also earn more money.   Moreover, the current structure already pits teams that are 
compensated (those that offer athletic scholarships) against teams that are not (e.g., Ivy 
League schools). 
At the very least, it remains to a trier of fact to determine if competitive balance is 
supported by the NCAA’s rules on amateurism.  In Law v. NCAA, the NCAA made the 
parallel argument that collusion to fix wages for assistant coaches was necessary to 
preserve competitive balance.23  In Law, the Court stated that despite whatever 
procompetitive role the NCAA plays in general, when it comes to concerted action 
regarding the hiring of inputs, its actions were naked price fixing.  In fact, the Court 
stated the NCAA had to prove “that the salary restrictions enhance competition, level an 
uneven playing field, or reduce coaching inequities.”24  Similarly, the NCAA has yet to 
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demonstrate that the current level of competitive balance would be harmed by the 
addition of wage competition to the options currently available for attracting top talent to 
college athletic programs. 
A Conference-based college sports market would most likely become more 
competitive and competitive balance might be enhanced.25  Leagues would compete for 
fans by choosing the wage structure that brought them the best combination of talent and 
fan appeal. If amateurism really sells tickets, then few schools will find it profitable to 
pay their athletes openly, and conferences that choose a paid regime will fail in the 
marketplace. If instead, talent sells tickets, and some conferences choose to pay for 
talent, they would likely gain market share at the expense of amateur conferences, etc.26  
Fans would also likely see higher quality contests as the top athletes might continue to 
play college sports instead of jumping prematurely to the professional leagues (where 
often their talent languishes at the end of the bench for the years they would have been 
playing, and starring, collegiately, and perhaps receiving an education). The end result of 
this inter-brand competition should be a more attractive and more profitable college 
sports market.27 
Would Conference Level Restraints Destroy the Product?  Would certain elements of 
the product cease to exist if the NCAA no longer imposed a single wage regime across all 
of Division 1?  The most obvious candidate is the NCAA end-of-season championships, 
which some might argue would be threatened by a fragmentation of the wage regime in 
the NCAA.  However, this assumes the current system requires that most conferences 
face an equal chance of competing in earnest for the championship.  This assumption 
ignores the fact that since 1967, teams from eight conferences have won the thirty-three 
 15
  
NCAA men’s basketball championships, with five of those conferences capturing twenty-
eight of those wins.28 There is no reason to suspect that a tournament matching dominant 
(well-paid) conferences against underdogs with lower (or no) compensation would be 
any less appealing than the current system which pits dominant conferences against 
underdogs at a common wage level. 
A more troublesome negative externality is that the non-revenue-generating 
sports would have to get more of their funding from sources other than the two major 
sports programs. It is worth noting that the estimated surpluses the NCAA generates as a 
whole include the cost of this cross-subsidization, so there are sufficient profits to absorb 
some of these increased costs.29  The question of whether the success of women’s college 
athletics since the passage of Title IX has been financed by the exploitation of certain 
male athletes is worthy of its own body of literature.30  This question does, however, 
raise important social questions, parallel to those raised in Brown University, beyond the 
scope of this article.  It is worth noting, however, that the cross-subsidization in Brown 
was by affluent students admitted to Ivy League universities for the benefit of poor, 
primarily minority students.  In the case of the NCAA, the revenue is generated 
disproportionately by African-Americans and the cross-subsidized sports are 
predominantly white.  The issue is by no means clear-cut. 31 
Conclusion 
The quote from the NCAA bylaws given at the beginning of this article harkens 
back to an era in college sports when the flow of dollars to and within athletic 
departments was simply a necessary function in order to allow sporting events to occur.  
Today, the NCAA rivals MLB, the NHL, the NBA, and the NFL in terms of its revenue 
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size, and so the question remains: is amateurism a necessary and reasonable restraint?  
The answer must be no.  College sports need not include amateurism to prosper.  
National on-field and on-court competition can thrive in a system of conference-level 
wage regimes, with the added benefit of off-court competition.  
In truth, if the NCAA took its mission to be that “student-athletes should be 
protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises,” the first and 
worst offender with which the NCAA should grapple would be the $3.5 billion NCAA 
itself.  A way to prevent the exploitation of the athletes is to allow competition among 
teams to pay players a salary in exchange for their services. 
( Daniel A. Rascher, Ph.D., is a Senior Economist at LECG, Inc. and an Adjunct 
Professor of Sport Management at the University of San Francisco.  Andrew D. Schwarz 
is a Senior Economist at LECG, Inc.  The views expressed in this article are solely those 
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of LECG, Inc., or the University of 
San Francisco.  We would like to thank Ernie Nadel for his valuable input. 
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designed “for the protection of amateurism” (and thus not subject to antitrust scrutiny).  
Almost fifteen years after Justice it is difficult to see how an agreement among 90+% of 
all competitors in a market to fix the wages paid to their primary input can be anything 
but “economic” in purpose. 
15 Rent seeking is activity designed to garner a share of unearned economic profits, i.e., 
rents. 
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16 In fact, the NCAA does allow professional athletes to play in NCAA sports.  Current 
rules allow for a player to retain amateur status in one sport while playing as a 
professional in another. 
17 From a theoretical perspective, the NCAA’s argument about amateurism as a “product 
quality” flies in the face of generally accepted theory.  It is inappropriate to consider 
price of an input as a factor in the consumer’s utility function, except for the alleged 
“luxury” or “demonstration” goods. 
18 “The professional era has helped revitalise the game in England, which, it has to be 
said, was getting a little stagnant.” See Ian Malin, Mud, Blood and Money: English 
Rugby Union Goes Professional, p. 13 (1997). 
19 Regarding this change, Mike Moran, Director of Public Information for USOC, said as 
in college sports, Olympics fans knew that some athletes were paid under the table, and 
this led the organizers to make the change: “We wanted to rid ourselves of the hypocrisy.  
Sponsors put up large amounts of money to support the Olympic Games and we think our 
athletes should share in that.”  See USA Today, 9/18/96. 
20 See Gary Becker,  College Athletes Should Get Paid What They Are Worth, Bus. Wk., 
Sept. 30, 1985, at 18. 
21 Some might note with irony that we are suggesting collusion at the conference level, an 
activity that was effectively barred by the various settlements in United States v. Brown 
University.  However, this is just another example of a case where sports need 
cooperation that other activities might not.  Concerted action may not be necessary for 
the Ivy League to provide financial aid to students, but it is necessary, at the appropriate 
level, for the Ivy League to exist as a distinct sports league. 
22 The NCAA might also facilitate the transfer of schools from one conference to another 
if they found themselves out of step with their conference’s decision of payment for 
athletes. 
23 The NCAA lost this case (affirmed by the Tenth Circuit) on summary judgment.  On 
March 9, 1999, the NCAA settled, agreeing to pay $54.5 million (an estimate of lost 
wages) to the approximately 2000 D1 entry-level assistant coaches who had been harmed 
by this agreement to fix wages. 
24 [[Law v. NCAA, http://laws.findlaw.com/uscircs/10th/963034.html for page]] 
25 The idea of creating competing joint ventures in sports is not new.  Stephen Ross has 
advocated breaking up monopoly sports leagues, claiming that the increased competition 
will ultimately benefit consumers.  See Stephen Ross, Break up the Sports League 
Monopolies, in P. Staudohar & J. Mangan, eds. (1991), The Business of Professional 
Sports. 
26 This would give lower prestige conferences an additional recruiting tool when 
competing for talent with the current dominant conferences: the ability to pay higher 
salaries. Compare this with the court’s theory in Law. v. NCAA, footnote 15. 
27 In fact, if the courts were to find that conferences are at the correct level for ensuring 
the various benefits of common structure on wages, the likely result would be a 
differentiated market for products, similar to the markets for branded goods.  
Consequently, the law on these two types of markets would both encourage reasonable 
intrabrand restraints, with the aim of promoting interbrand competition.  This 
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harmonization of two aspects of the antitrust law would be a welcomed side effect of 
revisiting the NCAA’s status as a wage fixing joint venture. 
28 Teams from the Big-10, Pac-10, ACC, SEC, and Big East. Louisville (the Metro 
Conference) won in 1980 and 1986.  Kansas (then Big-8) won in 1988 and UNLV (then 
the Big West) won in 1990. The fifth win, from Marquette (1977) was when Marquette 
was unaffiliated with any conference. 
29  Quantitative details of these estimated surpluses are available from the authors. 
30 Fifty two percent of NCAA football players and 61% of NCAA men’s basketball 
players are African-American, compared with a  percentage of 12.5% for the general U.S. 
population.  Evidence that a higher percentage of the premier players are African-
American comes from noting that the NBA and NFL are comprised of 79% and 66% of 
African-American players, respectively. 
31 A worst case scenario might be that some schools cancel the bulk of their sports 
programs.  As discussed above, this has important social and policy implications, which 
cannot be wished away.  Generally issues such as taxation of one group of workers to 
subsidize the wages of another group are addressed at the legislative level, where the 
affected workers have input through the democratic process.  Here, we see unilateral 
action by a cartel replacing taxation with representation. 
